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1. INTRODUCTION
Mean-field games model the rational behavior of an infi-
nite number of indistinguishable players in interaction [5].
An important assumption of mean-field games is that, as
the number of player is infinite, the decisions of an indi-
vidual player do not affect the dynamics of the mass. Each
player plays against the mass. A mean-field equilibrium cor-
responds to the case when the optimal decisions of a player
coincide with the decisions of the mass. This leads to a
simpler computation of the equilibrium.
It has been shown in [3, 4, 7] that for some games with
a finite number of players, the Nash equilibria converge to
mean-field equilibria as the number of players tends to infin-
ity. In fact, many authors argue that mean-field games are
a good approximation of symmetric stochastic games with
a large number of players, the rationale behind this being
that the impact of one player becomes negligible when the
number of players goes to infinity.
In this paper, we question this assertion. We show that,
in general, this convergence does not hold. In fact, the “tit
for tat” principle allows one to define many equilibria in
repeated or stochastic games with N players. However, in
mean-field games, the deviation of a single player is not visi-
ble by the population and therefore the “tit for tat” principle
cannot be applied. The conclusion is that, even if N -player
games have many equilibria with a good social cost, this
may not be the case for the limit game.
2. STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH IDENTI-
CAL PLAYERS
We consider a class of stochastic games, as introduced by
Shapley [6] for zero sum games and generalized by Fink [2] to
N players. Players are identical and anonymous, in the sense
that the dynamics, the costs and the action policies only
depend on the population distribution, as detailed below.
The finite state space of each player is S = {1, . . . , S} and
its finite action set is A = {1, . . . , A}. The players’ states at
time t are denoted by X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t), . . . , XN (t)),
with Xn(t) ∈ S. The state of the players evolve in continu-
ous time: each player n takes actions (denoted An(t) ∈ A)
at instants distributed according to a Poisson process, inde-
pendently of the others. The superposition of all these N
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activation processes forms a Poisson process whose intensity
is proportional to N , the number of players. If we only ob-
serve the system at these activation instants, and using uni-
formization, the system can be seen as a discrete time model
where players take actions at discrete times TN = {i/N}i∈N.
The population distribution at time t is denoted byM(t) ∈
P(S), where P(S) is the set of probability measures on S.
As the set S is finite, M(t) is a vector with |S| components
and for all s ∈ S, Ms(t) being the fraction of players in state
s at time t:
Ms(t) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1{Xn(t)=s}.
We assume that players interact according to a mean field
model, namely, the Markovian evolution of X(t) at time
t ∈ TN can be written as
P
(
Xn(t+
1
N
) = j
∣∣∣∣Xn(t) = i,M(t) = m, An(t) = a) =
1
N
Pij(a,m). (1)
We consider that each player chooses its own stationary
mixed strategies. Such a strategy is a measurable function
pi : S×P(S)→ P(A), that associates to each state i ∈ S and
each population distribution, a probability measure pii(m)
on the set of possible actions – P(S) and P(A) are the sets
of probability measures over S and A (as A is finite, P(A)
is the simplex). We denote by pii,a(m) the probability that,
under m, a player in state i takes action a,
At time t ∈ TN , the player n suffers an instantaneous cost
cXn(t),An(t)(M(t)), function of her state Xn(t), the action
that she takes An(t) and the population distribution M(t).
The objective of player n is to choose a strategy pin from
some set of admissible strategies Π, in order to minimize
her expected discounted payoff, knowing the strategies of
the others. The discount factor is denoted by β. Given a
strategy pin ∈ Π used by player n and a strategy pi ∈ Π
used by all the others, we denote by V (pin, pi) the expected
discounted payoff of player n:
V N (pin, pi) =
E
∑
t∈TN
e−βtcXn(t),An(t)(M(t))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ An has d.b. pi
n
An′ has d.b. pi (n
′ 6= n)
 .
An equilibrium for this game is a strategy pi such that a
player has no another admissible strategy that leads to a
higher payoff. This notion depends naturally on the set of
admissible strategies.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). For a given set of
strategies Π, a strategy pi ∈ Π is called a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in Π for the N player game if, for any strategy
pin ∈ Π,
V N (pi, pi) ≤ V N (pin, pi).
The existence of a stationary Nash equilibria is proven in
[2] when cia(m) and Pij(a,m) are continuous in m.
To make the connection with the mean field game model
presented below, let us remark that when all players use a
stationary strategy pi, the evolution of the population dis-
tribution satisfies
1
N
E
(
Mj(t+
1
N
)−Mj(t)
∣∣∣∣M(t)) =∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
Mi(t)Qij(a,M(t))pii,a(M(t)), (2)
where the rate matrix Q(a,M(t)) := P (a,M(t))− Id.
3. MEAN-FIELD GAME MODEL
We consider an infinite homogeneous population of play-
ers. We denote by mpi(t) ∈ P(S) the population distribu-
tion at time t. As the state space is finite, mpi(t) is a vector
whose ith component, mpii (t), is the proportion of players
in state i at time t. We assume that the initial condition
mpi(0) = m0 is fixed. For t ≥ 0, the population distribu-
tion evolves over time according to the following differential
equation: for j ∈ S
m˙pij (t) =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
mpii (t)Qij(a,m
pi(t))pii,a(m
pi(t)). (3)
The rationale behind this differential equation is Equation (2):
the players in state i that take action a ∈ A move to state
j at rate Qij(a,m
pi(t)).
We now concentrate on a particular player, that we call
Player 0. Player 0 chooses her own strategy pi0. We denote
by x(t) the probability distribution of Player 0 when she
applies strategy pi0 and the population uses strategy pi. For
a given state i ∈ S, xi(t) denotes the probability for Player 0
to be in state i at time t. The distribution x evolves over
time according to the following equation: for j ∈ S
x˙j(t) =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
xi(t)Qij(a,m
pi(t))pini,a(t). (4)
If Player 0 is in state i and takes an action a, it suffers from
the instantaneous cost ci,a(m
pi(t)), introduced in Section 2.
Given a population strategy pi and the strategy of Player 0
pin, we define the discounted cost of Player 0 as
V (pin, pi) =∫ ∞
0
(∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
xi(t)ci,a(m
pi(t))pini,a(m
pi(t))e−βt
)
dt,
where β is the discount factor. Player 0 chooses the strategy
that minimizes her expected cost, which depends as well on
the strategy pi. When Player 0 does so, we say it does the
best-response to the mass strategy pi.
BR(pi) = arg min
pin
V (pin, pi).
Definition 2 (Mean-Field Equilibrium). A strategy
is a (symmetric) mean-field equilibrium if it is a fixed point
for the best-response function, that is,
piMFE ∈ BR(piMFE).
Applying the Kakutani fixed point theorem for infinite
dimension spaces over a modified version of the correspon-
dence BR, one can show the existence of a mean-field equilib-
rium for these mean-field games under very mild continuity
assumptions. The proof is available in [1].
Theorem 1 (Existence of equilibrium, [1]). Assume
that Qij(a,m) and cia(m) are continuous in m. Then, there
always exists a mean-field equilibrium.
4. (NON-)CONVERGENCE
4.1 Mean-field games as a natural limit
Using classical arguments from mean field theory, one can
show that when the strategy of the players is given, the
population distribution for the N player game described in
Equation (2) converges to the population distribution of the
mean field limit (3). More precisely, in an N player-game,
the influence of a single player on the massm is of order 1/N .
In fact, it is shown in [7] that if the cost functions ci,a(m),
the transition kernels Qij(a,m) and the policy pii(m) are
continuous in m then the dynamics of the population con-
verges to the solution of the differential equation (3) and the
evolution of one player converges to solution of (4).
Furthermore, it is shown in [1] that under such continuity
conditions
(i) if pi be a mean-field equilibrium, then there exists N0
such that for all N ≥ N0, pi is a ε-equilibrium of the N
player game; and
(ii) if (piN )N is a sequence of Lipschitz-continuous strategies
such that piN is a equilibrium for the N player game, then,
any sub-sequence of the sequence (piN )N has a sub-sequence
that converges weakly to a mean-field equilibrium. This is
a more or less direct consequence of Theorem 3.3.2 in [7].
4.2 Counter-example in the general case
The positive result presented in the previous section uses
an important unnatural assumption: the strategy of a player
should be continuous in m. In the definition of a Nash equi-
librium, there is no a priori reason to restrict to strategies
that are continuous in m, even when the cost and transition
kernel are continuous in m. In this section, we show that
removing this assumption leads to a very different result.
To construct such an example, let is consider a symmet-
rical version of the prisoner’s dilemma. The state space of a
player is S = {C,D} (that stand for Cooperate and Defect,
respectively) and the action set is A = S. Let mC (resp.
mD) be the proportion of players in state C (resp. D). The
population distribution is m = (mC ,mD). The instanta-
neous cost of a player depends on her state i and on the
mass m:
ci,a(m) =
{
mC + 3mD if i = C
2mD if i = D
This cost corresponds to the expected cost of a player that
is matched with another player at random and suffers a cost
according to the following cost matrix:
C D
C 1, 1 3, 0
D 0, 3 2, 2
(5)
The state of a player coincides with her current action.
When a player chooses action a, the next state becomes
a with probability one. This gives the following transition
matrices:
P (C,m) =
(
1 0
1 0
)
and P (D,m) =
(
0 1
0 1
)
.
A player that has no impact on the actions of the other
players should play D: indeed, as indicated by the cost ma-
trix (5), its cost is smaller when she plays D. This leads to
the following result:
Lemma 1. There exists a unique mean-field equilibrium
pi∞ that consists in always playing D.
Proof. We consider that Player 0 has state vector x
and the mean-field is m. Taking into account that xC(t) +
xD(t) = mC(t) +mD(t) = 1, her expected cost is∫ ∞
0
[xC(t)mC(t) + 3xC(t)mD(t) + 2xD(t)mD(t)]e
−βtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
[xC(t) + 2mD(t)]e
−βtdt.
This cost is minimal when xC(t) is minimal. This shows
that the best response of player 0 is to always play D.
A similar proof shows that pi∞ is also a Nash equilib-
rium for the corresponding stochastic game with N players.
However it is not the only one. Let us define the following
stationary strategy:
piN (m) =
{
D if mC < 1
C if mC = 1.
This strategy can be rephrased as “play C as long as ev-
eryone else is playing C. Play D as soon as another player
deviates and play D”. This strategy is called a reward and
punishment strategy: as long as the others are cooperating,
I reward them by also cooperating myself. If one person de-
fects, playing D will punish everyone, including the defector,
who therefore has no incentive to defect.
This strategy is an equilibrium for the N player game:
Lemma 2. For β < 1 and N large, piN is a Nash equilib-
rium of the N-player stochastic game.
Proof. Assume that all players, except player 0, play the
strategy pi and let us compute the best response of player 0.
If at time 0, mC < 1, then the best response of player 0
is to play D. On the other hand, if mC = 1 and if player
0 becomes active, then if she uses pi, she will suffer a cost
1
N
∑∞
i=0 e
−βi/N =
∫
exp(−βt)dt+O(1/N) = 1/β + O(1/N).
If player 0 deviates from pi at this time step and chooses ac-
tion D, all players will also deviate after the next time step.
This implies that mD(t) = 1− exp(−t) and that the player
0 will suffer a cost equal to
∫∞
0
(xC(t) + 2 − 2e−t)e−βtdt +
O(1/N) ≥ 2/(β(β + 1)) + O(1/N) when N is large. This
shows that when β < 1, player 0 has no incentive to deviate
from the strategy pi so that, pi is a Nash equilibrium.
The Nash-equilibrium piN leads to a totally different sit-
uation from the mean-field equilibrium. In the first case,
when all players start in C, they always play C whereas in
the second case they will all play D. This shows that for this
game, there exists a sequence of Nash-equilibria that do not
converge to a mean-field equilibrium (although the cost and
the transition kernel are both Lipschitz-continuous). piN is a
social optimum while pi∞ has the worst possible social cost.
In mean-field games, a single player have a negligible im-
pact in the population distribution so that her individual
actions are not visible by the population. This is the reason
why the population can not punish a single player that de-
viates from the desired pattern. In other words, in the limit
game the “tit for tat” principle cannot be applied.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the convergence of finite stochas-
tic games to mean-field games when the number of players
tends to infinity. When we restrict to strategies that are
continuous in m, every Nash equilibria converge to a mean-
field equilibrium. However, when removing this restriction,
convergence to mean-field games does not hold in general.
When the number of players is finite, it is possible to
define many equilibria by using the “tit for tat” principle.
Indeed, players can cooperate to punish a player that does
not follow a desired pattern. These equilibria are linked
to the Folk theorem for repeated games, that states that,
when a one-shot game is repeated infinitely often, for each
achievable cost that is not worse than the Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game, there exists a “tit for tat” equilibrium
that achieves this payoff. When the number of players is
infinite, the deviation of a single player is not visible by the
population and, therefore, the equilibria that are based on
the “tit for tat” principle do not scale at the mean-field limit.
This is all the more damaging because these equilibria have
very good social costs: mean-field games fail to describe the
best equilibria.
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